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them to avoid such patients. Al-
though this concern may be valid, 
the new rule only exacerbates an 
inherent side effect of prospective 
payment in the absence of perfect 
risk adjustment: to the extent that 
certain observable patient char-
acteristics  are  associated  with 
higher costs and are not account-
ed for in the payment formula, 
the DRG system already rewards 
hospitals for avoiding patients with 
these risk factors. On the other 
side of the issue, some stakehold-
ers proposed substantial expan-
sions of the list of nonreimburs-
able conditions, given the extent of 
injuries, the number of deaths, 
and the magnitude of the expense 
associated with patient-safety prob-
lems in hospitals; the approval of 
a much larger set of conditions 
would have ratcheted up the fi-
nancial implications and made a 
more compelling case for  more 
fundamental and comprehensive 
reform of inpatient care. In the 
end, however, CMS ruled out a 
number of candidate conditions, 
either because they could not be 
identified through existing DRG 
codes or because of a lack of prov-
en strategies for preventing them.
In the same regulatory ruling, 
Medicare has also refined the DRG 
system to increase the extent of 
payment differentiation according 
to the severity of illness. Thus, 
along with emerging pay-for-per-
formance initiatives, the new pol-
icy appears to be part of a larger 
reform of the Medicare payment 
scheme. The current reform rests 
on the following three principles: 
payers should pay more for the 
treatment of conditions that re-
quire  more  resources  and  that 
the provider could not reasonably 
have prevented; they should pay 
more when evidence-based or con-
sensus-based  best  practices  are 
followed; and they should pay less 
or not at all for low-quality care. 
Naturally, the last will be the most 
controversial.
The conditions for which Medi-
care will cease to pay hospitals as 
of next October have been shown 
to be within the control of hos-
pitals, so there is a relatively com-
pelling case that their costs should 
fall on the provider rather than the 
purchaser. It is unclear how Medi-
care will generalize the principle 
of refusal to pay for poor-quality 
care beyond this initial and large-
ly symbolic effort. As inadequate 
as the store of evidence-based ben-
eficial practices appears to advo-
cates of pay for performance, there 
is even less empirical support or 
consensus for the identification 
of inappropriate or clearly contra-
indicated services and care pat-
terns.
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Nonpayment for Performance? Medicare’s New Reimbursement Rule
Satisfaction Guaranteed — “Payment by Results”  
for Biologic Agents
Alan M. Garber, M.D., Ph.D., and Mark B. McClellan, M.D., Ph.D.
A
s increasing numbers of prom-
ising but expensive biologic 
agents are introduced for use as 
medical treatments, drug pricing 
has become a high-profile issue. 
Earlier this year, pricing practices 
took a new turn in Britain, when 
the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE), the 
evaluative agency that applies cost-
effectiveness analysis in making 
recommendations concerning drug 
coverage, declined to support cov-
erage of the proteasome inhibi-
tor bortezomib (Velcade) by the 
British  National  Health  Service 
(NHS) for the treatment of mul-
tiple myeloma. It concluded that 
the price was too high relative to 
NICE’s  estimates  of  its  average 
benefits for the population to be 
covered. Rather than reducing bor-
tezomib’s price, its manufacturer, 
Johnson  &  Johnson,  offered  to 
forgo charges for patients who do 
not  have  an  adequate  response 
to the drug. Although many de-
tails remained to be negotiated 
— including the criteria defining 
a response — the proposal reflect-
ed the recognition that the time 
has  come  to  consider  new  ap-
proaches to drug pricing.
Payment based on results, in-
cluding “pay for performance,” has 
been touted as a way to avoid waste 
and increase value in health care.1 
In a conventional pay-for-perfor-
mance contract, a small part (typi-
cally, 1 to 10%) of the reimburse-
ment  to  providers  is  tied  to 
measures of the quality and cost 
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of the care they give. Johnson & 
Johnson’s proposal takes the con-
cept of pay for performance to its 
logical extreme, offering a money-
back guarantee that risks the loss 
of 100% of the drug price when 
the  desired  results  are  not 
achieved.
Furthermore, most performance 
incentives reward effort — often 
measured in terms of a provider’s 
compliance with practice guide-
lines  —  more  than  outcomes. 
Providers have resisted payments 
based on outcomes, which are in-
fluenced  by  difficult-to-measure 
factors they cannot control, such 
as patient compliance and disease 
severity. In results-based payment, 
the manufacturer supplies an un-
varying product, and the response 
to it depends heavily on the se-
lection of patients — a decision 
made by physicians and patients, 
not  the  company.  Why,  then, 
might  it  make  sense  to  accept 
payment  by  results  rather  than 
simply lowering the drug’s price? 
And how broadly can this pric-
ing model be applied?
In Britain, without a favorable 
determination by NICE, a costly 
new intervention is unlikely to be 
adopted  by  the  NHS.  Although 
NICE  does  not  make  decisions 
solely on the basis of cost-effec-
tiveness, in the past it has indi-
cated  that  it  generally  accepts 
interventions  whose  cost-effec-
tiveness ratio it estimates to be 
below about £30,000 per quality-
adjusted life-year for the intend-
ed population, though there have 
been exceptions.2
For drug manufacturers, fail-
ure to obtain NICE’s approval can 
mean  the  loss  of  a  substantial 
market. For most patients in Brit-
ain, it means paying for the drug 
out of pocket or through the small 
but  growing  private-insurance 
market.
Replacing a per-unit price with 
an outcome- or results-based price 
shifts financial risk from the pay-
er to the manufacturer. If NICE 
applied  the  definitions  of  re-
sponse used in major clinical tri-
als,  and  if  response  rates  were 
similar to those in trials, bortezo-
mib would sell at an effective dis-
count  rate  of  about  60%  when 
used  to  treat  relapsed  multiple 
myeloma.3,4 However, the reper-
cussions are different from those 
of a simple price cut. To maxi-
mize revenues, the manufacturer 
has a stronger incentive to maxi-
mize the number of patients with 
a response, not merely the num-
ber  of  patients  treated  or  doses 
sold. A focus on responders might 
encourage redoubled efforts to ad-
dress the undertreatment of indi-
cations for which a drug is effec-
tive. As a result, use of the drug 
may increase.
The fixed costs of bringing a 
pharmaceutical product to market 
can reach hundreds of millions of 
dollars, but the cost of producing 
each additional unit is very small 
in relation to the total cost and 
unit price. If the marginal cost of 
producing the drug is one tenth 
of the price, with payment by re-
sults, a manufacturer will profit 
by extending the treatment to any 
population of patients with a re-
sponse rate of at least 10%.
Payment by results also repre-
sents an innovative approach to ad-
dressing one of the central dilem-
mas in the allocation of drugs to 
patients — the fact that a treat-
ment’s benefits vary greatly, often 
in predictable ways, from one pa-
tient to another. Survivors of myo-
cardial infarction have larger short-
term survival benefits from statins 
than do young women with hyper-
cholesterolemia but with no oth-
er risk factors for heart disease. 
A much greater survival benefit of 
imatinib mesylate (Gleevec, Novar-
tis) has been demonstrated among 
patients with gastrointestinal stro-
mal  tumors  than  among  those 
with malignant glioma. Physicians 
may be aware of many other char-
acteristics that determine wheth-
er a patient is likely to benefit 
more or less than the enrollees 
in  a  study.  If  the  price  of  the 
compound is uniform, access is 
likely to be limited to patients in 
the population groups known to 
derive the greatest benefit (if the 
cost is paid by insurance) or will-
ing to pay the most (if patients 
spend their own money). Patients 
in groups that are not expected to 
derive particularly large benefit 
are less likely to receive treatment, 
often because payers will create 
barriers to such use of the drug. 
In results-based payment, payers 
face much less financial risk from 
treating such groups.
Manufacturers with a monopo-
ly often address variation in bene-
fits by charging different patients 
different prices (price discrimina-
tion).  Prices  might  be  lower  for 
low-income patients or for those 
not expected to receive large ben-
efits. This approach makes the 
treatment available to more pa-
tients  who  might  benefit  while 
increasing sales and profits. How-
ever, in many circumstances, price 
discrimination is difficult to im-
plement and unpopular, and both 
marketing considerations and po-
litical pressure limit its use.
Payment by results can extend 
access  to  drugs  while  avoiding 
some of these disadvantages. A 
manufacturer can earn more if 
nearly everyone in whom the per-
formance goal might be achieved 
receives treatment. It’s true that 
simply reducing the drug’s price 
would also increase the number of 
patients for whom the cost-effec-
tiveness ratio was favorable, but 
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the reduction would need to be 
deep to increase volumes by a sim-
ilar amount, and it would not cre-
ate similar incentives for ensuring 
that the patients likely to have high 
benefit received the drug.
Moreover,  the  payment-by-
  results approach obviates the need 
to calculate different cost-effective-
ness ratios for different groups of 
patients: as long as benefit is cap-
tured well by the response mea-
sure, cost-effectiveness can be cal-
culated the same way for everyone. 
In effect, payment by results cre-
ates a personalized rather than a 
population-based  cost-effective-
ness ratio, and the NHS need not 
restrict access for certain classes 
of patients to ensure that the cost-
effectiveness test is met.
With such advantages over sim-
ple unit pricing, why has results-
based pricing seldom been used? 
As  the  bortezomib  negotiations 
suggest, there are many practical 
challenges. First, there must be a 
clearly defined, objective measure 
of results, and it must closely cor-
respond to the desired treatment 
effect — that is, to a valid health 
outcome  measure.  Furthermore, 
the outcome measure must not be 
heavily  confounded  by  patient 
characteristics or by other treat-
ments. Survival, for example, is 
perhaps the most important out-
come of treatment, but it is not 
usually a practical measure, be-
cause it is heavily influenced by 
underlying  disease  and  by  any 
other treatments given and be-
cause the timeline for observing 
changes in survival may be im-
practically long. The use of a sur-
rogate measure, such as the mono-
clonal protein level in bortezomib’s 
case, will be most successful if it 
is a good biomarker or predictor 
of clinically meaningful outcomes 
and if it is not influenced by other 
treatments.
Johnson  &  Johnson  proposed 
to accept payment by results for 
patients in whom at least one oth-
er treatment had failed — a policy 
that  reduces  the  likelihood  that 
the  outcome  measure  would  be 
confounded  by  other  aspects  of 
care. In such patients, the mono-
clonal protein level is an accepted 
measure  of  treatment  response. 
Results-based  pricing  is  most 
likely to be successful in other 
settings in which response can be 
defined with similar objectivity 
and  reproducibility  and  among 
patients in whom other therapies 
have failed and whose condition 
is unlikely to improve if the com-
pound is not used.
Any criterion used for payment 
should  also  be  predictable,  reli-
able, and difficult to manipulate. 
If a test result is highly variable or 
subjective,  well-defined  criteria 
and audits would be crucial to en-
sure that the measure worked as 
intended. For example, should a 
transient  decrease  in  the  mono-
clonal protein level be considered 
a  response?  Are  multiple  mea-
sures necessary? If there is room 
for judgment, how will disagree-
ments  over  the  interpretation  of 
the performance criteria be adju-
dicated? If the performance mea-
sure is confounded by the under-
lying  health  of  the  patient,  it 
could result in overpayments for 
healthier patients, creating incen-
tives  for  focusing  on  lower-risk 
patients  rather  than  on  those 
most likely to benefit. Addressing 
this problem would require either 
a different price or different out-
come criteria for low-risk patients, 
either of which would complicate 
the approach.
Although  Johnson  &  Johnson 
and NICE reached agreement on 
an indicator, they differ over the 
appropriate threshold for payment 
— whether an adequate response 
should be defined as a 50% or just 
a  25%  reduction  in  the  serum 
monoclonal protein level. In the 
United Kingdom, the cost-effec-
tiveness standard will be deter-
mined by the NHS, not by com-
petitive or other mechanisms.
Clearly,  difficulties  of  imple-
mentation will limit the adoption 
of payment by results. Experience 
in overcoming the practical barri-
ers,  however,  may  well  address 
both payer and industry concerns 
about pricing for potentially valu-
able  drugs  while  increasing  the 
number of patients who can re-
ceive effective treatments.
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